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1Introduction
In recent years consumers, NGOs, and governments alike have become increasingly concerned about
the problem of ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds in relation to on-going armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Allegations by NGOs, governments and the
UN that many conflicts are fuelled by illicit exports of diamonds have begun to be acknowledged by
the diamond industry.  Diamonds, and the money they generate, have been used to purchase arms,
ammunition, uniforms and other equipment, as well as to pay soldiers and to cultivate strategic
alliances for those armed groups in control of territory rich in this lucrative resource.  This has
facilitated the intensification and protraction of violent conflicts in Africa.  Additionally, the wealth to
be gained from the illicit extraction and sale of diamonds has contributed to the prominence of
economic agendas in many civil wars that motivate faction leaders to continue the conflict in order to
protect their businesses.1  For example, the Angolan rebel group UNITA (União Nacional para a
Inedepência  Total de Angola) is believed to have received US$3.7 billion in a six year period during
the 1990s - a far greater amount than the foreign aid received from patrons like the United States and
South Africa during the Cold War.  This money has both funded large scale arms purchases and
swelled the personal coffers of UNITA leaders, thereby contributing to the intransigence of those
leaders in agreeing and implementing peace and facilitating continued violence.2  In Sierra Leone the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has funded its arms acquisitions with illicit diamond revenues and
the extraction of diamonds is seen as one of the main factors behind the lack of implementation of the
Lomé peace accord and the subsequent resurgence of violence.  In the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) both the government and rebel forces have financed their war efforts through the
diamond trade, as have some of the intervening regional powers.  As a result the fighting around
diamond rich areas and trading centres has been particularly intense.  For example, in spite of a
unilateral ceasefire declared by Rwanda on the 29th of May 1999, it is believed to have sent 7,000
fresh troops to the DRC in June as the battle for the diamond rich area of Mbuji-Mayi escalated.
However the prominence of ‘conflict diamonds’ in the policy discourse related to these conflicts and
their resolution has served to obscure a range of other issues which are equally, if not more, central to
finding lasting solutions to these wars.  In spite of the fact that the arms flows which sustain these
conflicts are only partly financed by ‘conflict diamonds’ they are often only mentioned as one aspect
of the illegal diamond trade rather than as a core issue.  Even more concerning, perhaps, is that the
discourse of ‘greed’ rather than ‘grievance’ as the foundation and driving force of conflicts obscures
the complexity of political, social, and other economic dimensions of these wars.  Thus, while efforts to
reduce the conflict diamond trade may be an essential element of the resolution of these conflicts,
other factors of potentially greater import are pushed down the agendas of many of the governments
and NGOs whose input into those processes may be the key to success.  In short, therefore, the issue
2of conflict diamonds is one aspect of the complex dynamics and processes of ongoing African
conflicts, not vice-versa.
What Are ‘Conflict Diamonds’?
The working definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ is that suggested by De Beers as those “diamonds which
originate from areas in Africa controlled by forces fighting the legitimate and internationally recognised
government of the relevant country.”  This definition explicitly restricts the application of the term to
diamonds that fuel African conflicts.  However, the NGO Global Witness, which has spearheaded the
campaign against conflict diamonds, has noted that while most concern related to conflict diamonds
stems from African conflicts, the problems associated with illicit diamond trading could conceivably
occur in any conflict country with extractable diamond resources.  Therefore, they suggest a non-
Africa specific definition which states that: “Diamonds that originate from areas under the control of
forces that are in opposition to elected and internationally recognised governments, or are in any way
connected to those groups, should be considered as conflict diamonds.”3
While the definition provided by Global Witness is an improvement on that suggested by De Beers, it
still restricts the application of the term to those diamonds that stem from rebel forces.  This is
problematic: if we are concerned about conflict diamonds because they fuel conflict, then there is an
imbalance generated by focusing solely on rebel forces fighting against governments.4  Governments
and their allied factions in civil wars may also bear a degree of responsibility, for the escalation of
violence may also fund such violence through diamond sales.  Thus, at the abstract level, it makes little
sense to exclude governments and pro-government forces from the definition of conflict diamond
trading.  At the practical level, however, one can see the reasoning behind this exclusion in two of the
main conflicts of concern.  In both Angola and Sierra Leone it is the rebel forces, UNITA and the
RUF (Revolutionary United Front) respectively, that are generally seen as responsible for ongoing
violence after elections designed to consolidate peace were held, and who dominate illicit diamond
extraction.  Nevertheless, if one looks at the third African conflict over which concerns about conflict
diamonds have been raised, that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the responsibility for violence
and associated human rights abuses lies both with the various rebel groups, backed by Rwanda and
Uganda, and the government of Laurent Kabila, backed by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and others
under the auspices of SADC (Southern African Development Community).  Thus, since the actors
involved in the extraction of conflict diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone are different from those in
the DRC, and if we are concerned with the role played by diamond trading in fuelling conflict, we
must define ‘conflict diamonds’ according to the direct roles played in fuelling conflicts irrespective of
the status of the actors.
3Any examination of the problem of conflict diamonds, and therefore of possible solutions, must be
rooted in the wider context of war economies.  It is not unusual for warring factions, both pro-
government and anti-government forces, to engage in resource extraction or criminal predation in
order to finance their war efforts and enrich the faction leaders.
War Economies, Resource Extraction and Globalisation
Commodities for arms transfers are a common feature of ‘warlords’ (faction leaders in control of
territory, resources, and associated trade) in many conflicts who control natural resources such as gold
or diamonds, or illicit goods produced in their territory, such as drugs. Such transfers may be direct
(commodities for arms barters), but more commonly are indirect, with non-state armed forces relying
on the earning power of war economies in which commodities are exchanged for hard currency to
provide the finances for the arms deal.5  In the case of conflict diamonds, however, the bartering of
gems for arms is commonplace, particularly when a neighbouring state offers both access to diamond
markets and a ready supply of weapons by acting as an intermediary in the international networks of
war economies.
Some analysts point to the growth of a global illicit economy in parallel with the globalisation of legal
trade.  Improved transport and communications infrastructure has facilitated the growth of commercial
interactions across the globe regardless of their legality.  The nexus between the globalised illicit
economy and the arms black market is closely related to the war economies established by conflict
protagonists during protracted wars.  Mark Duffield has recently claimed that:
Political actors have been able to control local economies and realize their worth through the
ability to forge new and flexible relations with liberalized global markets.  Manuel Castells, for
example, has argued that deregulation has prompted the emergence of a globalized criminal
economy.  This economy is internationally networked, expansive, and supremely adaptive.6
Regional illicit networks have increasingly overlapped as the illegal trades in drugs, precious stones,
minerals, metals, ivory, hardwoods, and arms, have been linked by the expansion of key actors, such
as transnational criminal organisations, into numerous illicit markets.  Naylor has claimed that:
it is no longer the operation of this or that individual black market...This does not add up to a
monolithic criminal conspiracy.  Modern black markets are complex, but they are not integrated
into neat monopolies or cartels.  If they were, they would be easier to control.  Instead of a
organizational hierarchy one finds a series of arms-length commercial relationships...The result
is that a modern covert arms deal is likely to take place within a matrix of black market
transactions.7  (Emphasis added).
In spite of this overlapping, the degree of globalisation of illicit trade appears to remain linked to
regional situations.  Thus, illicit drug production is still dominated by a few regions such as the golden
crescent and the golden triangle.  The trafficking networks of these drugs expand outwards as
4corridors of impunity develop as traffickers develop relationships with corrupt customs officials or
adapt routes to flow through the most porous borders, or away from crackdowns on their activity.
Similar dynamics have characterised the flow of conflict diamonds from UNITA in Angola and the
RUF in Sierra Leone in which regional transnational networks and neighbouring governments form the
key link between warlords and the international diamond market.8
The war economies of many conflicts, including, but not only, those aspects that involve ‘conflict
diamonds’, form the heart of co-operative commercial relationships between warring factions, regional
political leaders, and multi-national companies which form the basis of this regionalised parallel trade.
These actors utilise the opportunities of an increasingly globalised world to foster the exploitation of
criminalised war economies and to engage in international commerce.  Thus, regionalised illicit
economic alliances are increasingly significant actors in the global economy as the forces of
globalisation, such as increasing freedom of international financial flows, blur the boundaries between
legal and illegal trade resulting in greater opportunities and impunity for those profiting from war.  The
international attention paid to conflict diamonds is a response to one particular aspect of this, but it is
one that fails to acknowledge the blurred boundaries sufficiently, thereby dissociating the ‘conflict
diamond’ trade from the full range of structures of power and profit from which it results.
Similarly, insufficient attention has been paid to the links between ‘conflict diamonds’ and other
aspects of war economies and illicit trades.  For example, the links between the illicit trade in arms and
that in other commodities are more than analogous.  They very often flow through the same networks
with the same traffickers exchanging arms for these other commodities.  In the case of conflict
diamonds, UNITA is believed to have actively sought out arms dealers willing to take diamonds in
exchange for weapons.  Likewise, numerous shipments of arms to the RUF from and through
neighbouring states such as Liberia and Burkina Faso in return for diamonds, and the commercial
networks between the governments of DRC and Zimbabwe have facilitated arms transfers with
payment off-set by mining concessions.
It should be noted that diamonds are not the only commodities in the war economies of the conflicts in
Angola, Sierra Leone, and DRC.  For example, UNITA in Angola have also sold gold, coffee, timber
and ivory to generate funds for arms purchases, the RUF in Sierra Leone have engaged in co-
operative predation with government forces against civilians, and the RCD rebels in the DRC, as well
as their Rwandan and Ugandan allies, have profited from the sale of gold, timber, coffee, ivory, and
palm oil.
Nevertheless, the nature of the trade in conflict diamonds is different to the trade in some other illicit
goods that fuel conflicts in the same way.  The illicit trade in drugs, and some illicit arms transfers,
5remain wholly outside of legal supply channels.  The trade in conflict diamonds, however, is predicated
on the ability of those involved to insert the illicitly extracted stones into the legal wholesale and retail
markets.  (Sales of gold, timber, ivory, and other commodities that have also fuelled conflicts often also
need to enter legal markets).  It is this nexus of the legal and illegal trades that has raised awareness
of the issue since consumers can buy illicit diamonds unknowingly on the legal market.   This nexus
also presents the key opportunity for control.  It is generally accepted that if conflict diamonds can be
denied access to the legal market, the illicit trade will be marginalised and reduced.  At least this is the
argument put forward by the diamond industry as it is faced with a possible consumer boycott of its
products much like that which occurred with the fur trade.  However, it must be noted that for such
marginalisation to occur, universally accepted and enforced controls must be put in place – any gap in
the regime will almost certainly become a channel for conflict diamonds.
To put this nexus between the legal and illicit trades into perspective, De Beers estimate that the trade
in conflict diamonds, as defined above, accounts for approximately four percent of the annual global
trade.  Others, such as the US and UK governments expect that the true figure is higher.  Certainly
the gross inadequacy of existing regulation and monitoring of international transfers of diamonds,
resulting in great difficulty in ascertaining the origin of diamonds, must cast doubt on the reliability of
this estimate.  With global diamond production at US$6.8 billion in 1999, even this low estimate results
in a total value of conflict diamonds of US$272 million.
Most of the international diamond trade is relatively concentrated, with over half of the global output
coming from just five countries (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Canada, and Australia) that have a
good level of regulation and monitoring.  Russia is also a major diamond producer, but information on
its regulatory capacity is limited. Cities such as Antwerp, London, and Tel Aviv are the major centres
of trade for diamonds from the 26 producing countries.  However, little legal regulation of this trade
occurs, with most deals done on trust and ‘honour’ rather than through legal contracts, thereby making
it substantially easier for conflict diamonds to enter the ‘legal’ wholesale and retail markets.
Additionally, the role of monitoring imports and exports of diamonds from the markets in Antwerp is
filled by the HRD (Hoge Raad voor Diamant / Diamond High Council), the same organisation that
represents and lobbies for the diamond industry.  This results in a conflict of interests in which the
interests of profit appear to be the stronger.  Thus, it has been claimed that:
In recent years there have been a number of judicial inquiries which have shown that the
overall system violates almost any definition of neutrality, and is an invitation to corruption.
Cases of fraud in the Antwerp diamond trade are legendary and Antwerp has become one of
the primary world centres for Russian organized crime.9
6Undoubtedly, in the majority of cases of conflict diamonds entering the Antwerp markets the key
aspect was not corruption but rather inadequate monitoring which, as a matter of procedure, records
the origin of diamonds as the last country from which they were exported.  This inadequacy allows,
for instance, Sierra Leone diamonds to be registered as coming from Liberia and Burkina Faso.
Who Is Responsible?
Mark Duffield has claimed that:
Today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think
globally.  In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore
banking facilities, and Northern governments has assisted the development of war economies.
There is a growing symbiotic relationship between zones of stability and instability within the
global political economy.10
Responsibility for the trade in conflict diamonds, and particularly for the access to markets afforded to
warring factions by the existing system, is the key issue.  Consumers, be they governments, industries,
or individuals, wishing to avoid indirect responsibility for fuelling conflicts in Africa are at the heart of
the current momentum against conflict diamonds.  If consumers discriminate over the diamonds they
purchase on the grounds of this potential indirect responsibility, it follows that, to some degree, they
must hold the international diamond industry responsible for the entry of ‘blood’ diamonds onto the
market - at the very least it reflects a growing crisis in public trust for the industry.
The Diamond Industry
The diamond industry is concentrated in a handful of large companies each of which may bear an
individual responsibility for some conflict diamonds transfers, and bear collective responsibility for the
phenomenon in general.  Among the largest of these companies is De Beers, which mines 50% of
rough diamonds, and also part owns, with the respective governments, much of the diamond industry in
Botswana and Namibia.  Numerous medium sized companies also operate the extraction of diamonds
from particular mines.  In most cases of conflict diamonds these large companies do not operate the
mines held by rebel factions. They may, however, purchase diamonds from the rebels, thereby
providing access to legal markets.  For example, De Beers is known to have purchased large amounts
of diamonds from UNITA.  However, De Beers maintains that it has never directly purchased
diamonds from the Angolan rebels, but as Global Witness claim:
this is a complete abdication of corporate responsibility, and it further raises the question of
whom exactly the De Beers staff, who were based in DRC along the Angolan border, thought
they were paying for the diamonds that flooded across that border up until the fall of Mobutu
in 1997.11
7Most conflict diamonds appear to have entered the ‘legal’ market before or on arrival at the main
trading centres.  Indeed De Beers admits that it has purchased diamonds that originated from UNITA,
unknowingly, on the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv.  This is eminently plausible, since Belgium is
the biggest market for rough diamonds with 80% of rough, and more then 50% of polished diamonds
being traded through Antwerp.  Additionally, because diamonds from UNITA held areas are
distinctive when raw, and since the imposition of the UN Security Council Embargo on UNITA
diamonds passed in 1998, they are often routed through Israel and/or Ukraine where they receive a
first polish which masks their origin.12  It has also been claimed that most conflict diamonds are
transported in packets mixed with those from legitimate sources, thus rendering identification, under
existing procedures, close to impossible.
From Antwerp diamonds are transferred through Switzerland, for tax purposes, to the London based
Central Selling Organisation (CSO) through which 70% of all diamonds mined are sold.  By this point
conflict diamonds are sold alongside, or amongst, those legally produced.
The diamond industry as a whole bears much of the responsibility for the ease of entry of conflict
diamonds into legal markets.  While in many transactions Certificates of Origin are required, they are
easily forged and not yet standardised globally.  It is interesting to note that similar problems beset the
illicit flow of arms back to the warring factions, with end-use and end-user certificates easily forged or
obtained through corrupt officials.  Legal exports of arms require the provision of an end-user
certificate and other official documentation issued by the government of the ostensible end-user as
proof to the export licensing body.  In illicit transfers which pervert legal channels, as opposed to those
which avoid them altogether, such documentation is either forged, made easier by a lack of standard
formats of these certificates, or acquired from corrupt officials in other state bureaucracies.  It has
been claimed that most end-user certificates used in such illicit arms transfers are genuine but
corruptly issued.
A similar problem might beset even a universal scheme of certificates of origin, particularly in the case
of conflict diamonds, where neighbouring states may provide such certification either through the
actions of corrupt officials or as covert state assistance to the warring faction.  Thus, for example,
given the porousness of Sierra Leone’s borders with Liberia, in addition to established smuggling
routes and networks of traffickers, brokers, and officials, the establishment of a universal certificate of
origin regime would do little to stem the laundering of conflict diamonds through complicit neighbours.
Such a system is currently under discussion amongst diamond industry organisations and governments.
If it is to be successful, it will have to be accompanied by stringent measures for the investigation of
apparent disparities between production capability and exports, and punitive measures for laundering
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market.  The International Diamond Manufacturers Association has proposed that a new international
body, the International Diamond Council, be established with the power to remove the rights of
countries to export diamonds if they exceed known production or verified official imports.  Likewise,
countries found to be importing uncertified diamond packages would also lose the right to import any
diamonds legally.  This regime would greatly enhance mechanisms such as UN embargoes, but may
generate concerns from legitimate exporters who may find themselves subject to such sanctions
because of the actions of a handful of corrupt officials.  Such concerns might be assuaged if, when a
possible abuse of the legal trade is detected, an investigation is triggered into the nature and scale of
complicity, throughout the duration of which some exports would be allowed, but limited to a quota of
certainly no more than apparent production capability, thus rendering engagement in laundering
diamonds costly rather than profitable.  Further sanctions could then be imposed, or not, when the
investigation was completed, with automatic bans resulting from a lack of co-operation with the
investigators.
As noted above, however, if support is not universal, gaps in the regime are likely to arise which could
become channels for conflict diamond flows.  Nevertheless, if the necessary monitoring is stringent
enough, such channels would remain small for fear of detection.  Even though the legal trade in
diamonds is relatively concentrated the levels of monitoring required to have this effect would be far
greater than any in place for other commodities and thus, while potentially politically successful, this
certification scheme is unlikely to attain the required level of effectiveness.
Peter Meeus, the director of the Antwerp High Diamond Council, has complained that the diamond
industry has been singled out as a culprit by Western governments who themselves do not do enough
to end the African conflicts they have been charged with fuelling.  This complaint is akin to arguing
that because others also do things that fuel conflict, the diamond industry should not be held to account
for its role, at least until such time as all other activities and actors are equally accountable.
International opprobrium over the fuelling of violent internecine conflicts is not restricted to diamonds,
and in fact issues such as small arms and landmines have been on international agendas for far longer
than the diamonds issue.  Nevertheless, the complaint is valid in the sense that a far greater range of
commodities than diamonds have the potential to fuel conflicts in the same way.  Although the flow of
conflict diamonds is a significant problem, stemming that flow will not end the conflicts or prevent
others.  While those governments that push for an end to the conflict diamonds trade must accept this
simple fact, it should not detract from efforts to limit the problem.
The diamond industry has also claimed that, even if it were possible to determine the origin of
diamonds to be from a conflict area, if they didn’t buy them, somebody else would.  This claim, also
9used by those selling arms, is anachronistic and although used in order to guard against blame, is no
excuse for complicity in trading in ‘blood diamonds’.  This claim will also become less pertinent as
regulation of the global diamond trade grows.
While the diamond trade has been largely unregulated in the past, major diamond industry players such
as De Beers, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA), and the World Diamond
Congress, have proposed mechanisms that are essentially self-regulatory but with the back-up of
national legislation and a new international body, the International Diamond Council.  The key aspects
of the plans proposed by each of these inter-related bodies emphasise the need for standardised
documents, including certificates of origin, to be enhanced by various legal and self-regulatory
transparency measures.  There is also an emerging consensus that there is a need for the
governments of all exporting, processing and importing states to enact legislation that makes it illegal to
participate in the trade of uncertified diamonds.
Measures related to particular conflicts are already being put in place.  For example, Sierra Leone has
now instituted a new certification scheme involving tamper proof certificates of origin for sealed
packets of diamonds.  These certificates are produced in the UK and paid for by the British
government.  They are to be issued by the diamond and gold office in Freetown and diamonds can
only be exported by four international dealers.  De Beers was approached for being a fifth but
declined until the system has been proven to run smoothly.  To its credit, De Beers is providing
samples of Sierra Leone diamonds to importers for comparison with imported packets to help
guarantee that conflict diamonds are not exported.  Nevertheless, the success of this system depends
heavily on the co-operation and commitment of officials in importing states.  While officials in
Antwerp are fairly proactive in this regard, thanks to international pressure, Alex Yearsley of the
NGO Global Witness claims that “In Tel Aviv they are patently not interested.”  This creates the
potential for conflict diamonds to enter legal markets regardless of the new scheme, particularly when
there are concerns over the probity of the process within Sierra Leone itself.  This dilemma illustrates
the fact that until there is a universal and legally binding mechanism for denying conflict diamonds
access to legal markets, the most that can be hoped for is a contraction in the range of potential
trading routes.  This is echoed by the Kimberley Technical Forum during the Ministerial Conference
on Diamonds in Pretoria on the 21st of September 2000, at which Peter Hain claimed that:
Although there are relatively few major producers and importers of rough diamonds, the
effectiveness of the new regime in blocking market access to ‘conflict diamonds’ depends on
all diamond producing, exporting and importing states agreeing to participate.  An inclusive
process under UN auspices would make this possible.13
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Governments of Exporting, Importing and Transit States
Governments of exporting, importing and transit states also bear some responsibility for allowing
conflict diamonds to enter legal markets.  This responsibility is either through direct involvement in the
illicit trade, or poor monitoring of ostensibly legal transfers.  Direct involvement is restricted to
neighbours and allies of the rebel groups, or the government of the conflict state itself.  Indirect
responsibility is a more general phenomenon and may implicate any trading or importing state.
Criminalised war economies create opportunities for building covert strategic alliances between
warlords, politicians, regional leaders, multinational companies and even peacekeepers.  These
alliances form the networks that allow the trading in diamonds and the return trade in arms and
ammunition.  They operate at different levels from within the conflict state to regional or global
networks.
Within the conflict state tacit alliances may be generated between enemy factions, government
officials and peacekeeping forces.  For example, Kenema in the eastern region of Sierra Leone, while
under government control, has been used as a trading post for RUF diamonds which combatants sell
to dealers in the city.  The value of Kenema as a market for illicitly mined diamonds has prevented
attacks by rebels.  In Angola there have been persistent rumours that government forces, particularly
FAA generals, have been involved in selling diamonds on behalf of UNITA, although it is not clear
whether they merely use the same middlemen.  These networks may involve direct co-operation
between ostensibly opposing sides, or tacit agreements whereby the two, or more, sides avoid
interfering with each other’s economic activities.  In some cases both may take place, for example,
the Nigerian-led ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group) forces in Sierra Leone are
believed to be engaged in a wide range of economic activities including the illicit extraction of
diamonds.  Indeed several ECOMOG force commanders and other high level officers have profited
from RUF economic activities.  For example, former force commander Brigadier General Maxwell
Khobe was commonly known as the “Ten Million man” because of allegations that he received up to
10 million dollars in return for permitting the activities of the RUF.14  The commander of the UN
peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, has alleged that this tacit alliance remains between
Nigerian contingents of the UN force and the RUF.  Conflict diamonds can also be used by
governments to support the costs of their war efforts.  In Sierra Leone, for example, when President
Valentine Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Julius Maada Bio in January 1996, Maada Bio
continued the arms build-up begun by Strasser, purchasing a large number of arms from Russia and
other sources using revenues from the sale of diamonds.  It is also likely that revenues from a recent
US$700 million diamond deal between the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Israeli diamond company IDI Diamonds will be channelled into the on-going war.
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The regional dimensions of war economy networks are often linked to governments or companies in
neighbouring states such as Liberia, in the case of Sierra Leone, DRC, Zambia, Namibia, and South
Africa in the case of Angola.  Many conflict diamonds enter legal trade channels through neighbouring
states.  In the case of the RUF in Sierra Leone, the involvement of President Charles Taylor of
neighbouring Liberia, and other members of his government, has been a prominent feature of the
continued violence by the RUF, though denied by the Liberian government.  During Liberia’s own civil
war Charles Taylor, as leader of the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), was the main patron
of the RUF, and funnelled arms to the Sierra Leonean faction for both strategic and economic gains,
including control over diamond areas in Sierra Leone.15  Recent allegations regarding the role of
Charles Taylor’s government in arms-for-diamonds trading with the RUF also extend to the
governments of Burkina Faso, led by Blaise Compaore, and Libya, under Gadaffi, both of which have
long been instrumental in the flow of weapons to the RUF.  States neighbouring Sierra Leone, and
those with links to the RUF, have benefited from, and facilitated, the transfer of conflict diamonds.  In
many cases these transfers have been poorly shrouded by official exports.  Thus, in recent years,
Liberia has exported more than 40 times the amount of diamonds that its reserves are capable of
producing per year.  This anomaly is largely explained by the trading in RUF diamonds.  Likewise,
neighbouring Guinea has exported 2.8 times its annual production, and Côte d’Ivoire has exported 8
times its capability.
To illustrate the close relationship between these governments and the diamond trade, on the 5th of
June 2000 Charles Taylor reportedly accompanied high-ranking RUF commanders to a meeting with
President Compaore in the Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou.  One RUF leader, Gibril Massaquoi, was
allegedly collected from the Kono diamond area of Sierra Leone (currently under RUF control) by a
Liberian helicopter.  Massaquoi was carrying a consignment of diamonds to pay for Burkina Faso’s
“military support”, of predominantly Bulgarian weapons.  Likewise, five days later he flew to the
Liberian capital Monrovia to pay for Liberian supplies of arms, six truckloads of which were delivered
across the Sierra Leone border.  Additionally, Charles Taylor is believed to have instructed his
company to establish a subsidiary for Sierra Leone operations, to be based in Monrovia, and with
offices in Ouagadougou.
Similarly, the late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire aided UNITA in Angola until his overthrow in 1997.
This aid took the form of arms-for-diamonds barters and payments of diamonds and cash to Mobutu
by Savimbi as a means of strengthening their relationship and in exchange for various favours.  After
Mobutu’s overthrow by Laurent Kabila, and the subsequent Angolan intervention in the DRC conflict,
Zambia’s importance for the laundering and transit of conflict diamonds has increased substantially,
and much of UNITA’s diamond for arms trading shifted to the West African states of Togo, Burkina
Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire.
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The case of the DRC conflict is somewhat different, in the sense that the regional dimensions of the
war economy are far stronger.  Indeed governments and businesses in the intervening states have
profited directly from the extraction of various natural resources such as diamonds, gold, and
numerous others.  In the cases of Zimbabwe, intervening on the side of Laurent Kabila’s government,
and Rwanda and Uganda, intervening and assisting different rebel RCD factions, the military officers
involved have often been alleged to be extracting natural resources.  Indeed in the DRC the role of
neighbouring and other regional governments and companies has been one of direct engagement and
profiteering rather than collusion with the war economies of rebel forces.  This involvement, and the
potential nexus with arms flows, is particularly well documented in the case of the Zimbabwean
intervention.  Firstly, the Zimbabwean state-owned arms producer, Zimbabwe Defence Industries
(ZDI), provided Kabila with large quantities of small arms ammunition and mortar bombs as well as
food-rations, uniforms, and boots.  Zimbabwe is also believed to have acted as a conduit for arms
imported by the DRC from China and North Korea.16
The war in DRC has indeed yielded significant commercial benefits for Zimbabwe.  For example, in
November 1998 Billy Rautenbach, a white Zimbabwean, was appointed Executive Chairman of
Gécamines (the DRC state mining company).17  Rautenbach and a Zimbabwean arms dealer, John
Arnold Bredenkamp, are believed to have supplied munitions to Congolese and Zimbabwean armed
forces in deals financed through schemes in which Zimbabwe would be able to invest in Congo’s
mining sector in order to defray the costs of arms procurement.  Intervention in the DRC has opened
up economic opportunities for Zimbabwean businesses, particularly those associated with Robert
Mugabe’s friends and family; for example, there are rumours of a Zim$200 million (£3.4 million)
commercial contract between Mugabe and Kabila; various mining interests; and allegations of a
lucrative cobalt deal with members of Mugabe’s clan.18
Other African transit states may also be used, such as the role of Burkina Faso in UNITA diamond
shipments and the return flow of arms.  In his report on the UN Sanctions against UNITA, Robert
Fowler claimed that:
The panel heard testimony from a source close to Savimbi that with the exception of the
President of Burkina Faso the UNITA leader regarded his political friendships with
African leaders as being essentially business relationships.  Certain services were
provided and in return certain payments were made.  In the case of Togo, the source
recalled an incident in October 1998 when Savimbi had refused to pay what had been
asked of him by President Eyadema, and Eyadema has as a result refused to allow the
13
release to UNITA of a missile system that had been delivered to the airport at Kara for
UNITA, and that was to be sent to Andulo.19
Governments of major importing states also have some indirect involvement in the conflict diamonds
trade.  In the same way that individual consumers have become concerned with the implications of
‘blood diamonds’ so have some major importing states.  The USA, for instance, imports approximately
48% of the wholesale diamond jewellery trade each year.  In response to growing concern about the
origin of diamonds the US government recently announced a ban on diamond imports from six African
nations suspected of involvement in the trade in conflict diamonds.  However, it should be noted that
while many western governments, such as Britain and the United States, have led the campaign
against conflict diamonds, their reasons for doing so may be mixed.  The threat of a consumer
backlash against the diamond industry as whole threatens major markets in these states.  Also, by
focusing attention on to this particular problem they can be seen to be pursuing solutions to African
conflicts while avoiding the more difficult, yet fundamental, problems at the heart of those conflicts.
It is also important to note the role of the numerous dealers and middlemen that facilitate the
movement of conflict diamonds from illicit sources to the diamond processing and trading centres.
These middlemen are often key parts of the smuggling infrastructure of war economies and provide
the essential link between warlords and the legal markets.  According to a recent report in Le Monde,
“The laundering circuits via neighbouring countries are well organized.  Lebanese in West Africa,
Belgians in the Great Lakes region, and Israelis in Southern Africa.”20  Effective controls of illicit
resource extraction and related arms procurement are unlikely until such infrastructure is dismantled
and those dealers marginalized.
What Is Being Done?
In response to growing concern about the trade in conflict diamonds numerous policies have been
initiated.  It appears that the diamond industry, while initially reluctant to acknowledge the scale or
nature of the problem, has become more convinced of the need to reform, and to do so publicly, in
order to avoid the prospect of a consumer boycott.  Thus the 2000 meeting of the World Diamond
Congress resulted in a plan, to be implemented by the end of 2000, to allow the certification of the
origin of diamonds and requiring that all countries importing diamonds enact legislation that requires
that all diamonds arrive in registered and sealed packets.  This move was welcomed by NGOs such as
Global Witness, but nevertheless addresses the problem rather late in the supply chain, long after
conflict diamonds have often entered legal channels, particularly when supplies are from conflict-
wracked states that may lack the regulatory capacity to ensure that diamonds are conflict-free.  In
addition, De Beers, the Diamond High Council, the Israeli Diamond Exchange, and India (a major
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centre for the processing of diamonds), have threatened to ban any member who knowingly trades in
diamonds obtained from rebel groups in Africa.  The aforementioned proposals for an International
Diamond Council (IDC) appear to be progressing well and, if imbued with sufficient investigative and
punitive powers the IDC will go a long way towards isolating the conflict diamonds trade.  However,
for the IDC and associated mechanisms to be successful, a great deal more commitment is required
from the diamond industry and governments.
Some governments have also taken steps, such as the import ban imposed by the United States, to
target conflict diamonds.  The French government, for example, at the recent G-8 summit in Japan,
proposed a permanent UN panel to help target sanctions and oversee “the imposition of bans on illicit
trafficking in diamonds and other raw materials that fund wars.”21  However, the same French
government was critical of the Fowler report on UN sanctions against UNITA and exerted diplomatic
pressure on the UN prior to the release of the report in order to protect its former colonies from the
degree of opprobrium contained in the draft report.
Within the UN, a two day hearing of the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone
led to the announcement by Kofi Annan of the creation of a five-person panel of experts, to report by
the end of October.  Also the European Commission has announced an 18-month ban on the import of
rough diamonds from Sierra Leone in line with the UN Security Council embargo adopted earlier in
July.
These actions are encouraging and both the diamond industry and governments should be applauded
for these efforts.  The concerns raised by De Beers, and others, concerning the impact of possible
boycotts of diamonds on the economies of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, which are
dependent on legal diamond trading, should remain an important element of the development of policy
mechanisms.  Such concerns should be used as added momentum for change rather than an
obstruction to it.
While no mechanism is ever likely to eradicate the illicit trade in diamonds, such transactions can be
made much more difficult so that the profitability of illicit trading decreases beneath the critical mass
which makes illicit extraction and the violence it perpetuates profitable for warring factions.  For this
to occur the momentum of change established by campaigns against ‘blood diamonds’ must continue.
Nevertheless, just as the problem of conflict diamonds cannot be understood outside of the context of
war economies and related arms transfers, the conflicts associated with ‘blood diamonds’ cannot be
understood or resolved without dealing with a far wider range of issues than the diamond trade.
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“Silences are the loudest voices.” 1
Steve Smith
Introduction
Just a glance through the literature and current debates in the field of conflict management will suffice
to show that the field of conflict management – like the discipline of International Relations (IR) until
the end of the 1980s – remained by and large silent about “gender”. As a result, sophisticated gender-
specific or gender-related in-depth analysis of conflict management is still strikingly missing.
Yet, by the end of the 1990s some policy-related institutions of conflict management practice started
slowly but surely focusing on a more “gender-sensitive” approach: IGOs like the UN2, OSCE3 and
EU4 have produced a substantial body of wide ranging policy recommendations on the position of
women in violent conflicts and on the mainstreaming of “gender” into policies related to post-conflict
rehabilitation, development and peace-building.5 By the same token, NGOs like OXFAM6,
International Alert7, etc., have begun stressing the “gender” dimension of conflict and its implications
for the peace-building process and their own work for the last couple of years. However, conflict
management as theory remains resistant to gender-related issues, not to mention a gender-sensitive
analysis of its theoretical implications.
Hence the intriguing question that pops up is not so much why gender actually matters8, but why it still
does not (appear to) matter in the overall field of conflict management.  In others words, what are
the main reasons for the persistent and pertinent gender-blindness in conflict management as theory
(and practice)? For the sake of clarity, I will distinguish between more conflict management-related
reasons on the hand and more feminism-related reasons on the other hand. Finally, the paper tries to
develop some preliminary lessons for the engendering process of the overall field of conflict
management.
Before we venture further into the task set, several comments are in order for the sake of clarity.
First, as theorising on “gender in conflict management” is in its infancy, the intention here is to paint in
rather broad strokes and to offer some initial provocations for further debate and research. Second, as
the main area of interest is conflict management in the international arena, much of the argument that
follows has an analytical focus derived from feminist critiques of international relations. Third, there
has to be a word or two about definitions. What does “engendering” mean, how do we define
“conflict management” and the “field of conflict management”?
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“Engendering” refers - in varying degrees - to both ongoing projects of feminism, the deconstruction9
of gender-biased knowledge claims (i.e. revealing androcentrism in fundamental categories, in
empirical studies and in theoretical perspectives, locating “invisible” women, and incorporating
women's activities, experience, and understanding)10 and the reconstruction of a gender-sensitive
theory and practice (i.e. exploring theoretical implications of taking gender seriously).11 Gender should
be defined as the social construction of social relations between “women” and “men”. (In the
following I will use “men” and “women” without quotation marks. I do so without posing the “gender”
categories as fixed, permanent and essential. Rather, I consider both terms as socially constructed and
manipulated subject statuses that emerge from a politicisation of slightly different anatomies in labour,
work etc.). As such gender must be seen in terms of the individual gender identity  (social norms
and the socially constructed individual identity), the symbolism of gender (classification of
stereotypical gender-dualisms12) and the structure of gender (the organisation and institutionalisation
of social action in the public and private sphere.)13
The use of the term “conflict management” is inconsistent throughout the literature in the field of
conflict management. In fact, the field of conflict management consists of a plethora of different
theoretical approaches and conceptual frameworks that may be, especially for newcomers to the field,
rather irritating if not confusing at times. To keep it simple, the paper uses a rather broad definition of
“conflict management” which embraces all pro-active forms of conflict handling including conflict
settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation approaches. For the purpose of this paper, all
three approaches to conflict management will be used interchangeably.14 However, when the
analytical focus is put on the process-oriented approach, one finds the term “conflict
resolution/transformation”. When the emphasis is more on an outcome-oriented approach, one comes
across the term “conflict settlement”. The overall “field of conflict management” should be best
understood as a rather complex, multidisciplinary area study of different disciplines such as
(international) law, psychology, philosophy, international relations, conflict/peace research, political
science, economics, social anthropology etc.
The Problem: The Male/Mainstream15of Conflict Management and its
Gender-Blindness
First of all, one could argue that given its multidisciplinary nature the gender-blindness of conflict
management should not come as a surprise, as it “just” reflects the gender-blind spots of the
underlying disciplines mentioned above. However, in the last two decades or so in most disciplines
feminists started deconstructing, and, yet to a lesser degree, reconstructing the discipline-specific
gender-blind spots.16
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Why the engendering process of conflict/peace research and the field of conflict management
especially in contrast to development studies has been somehow marginal is another intriguing
question, which cannot be tackled here in any great length. What seems to matter most here is that by
the end of the 1980s/early 1990s, gender has been a central category in Development Studies.17 Since
there has been a huge theoretical and empirical body of evidence on the “gendered” nature of
development aid/policy and its implying “male bias”18 - both at the conceptual level of structural
adjustment programmes and in their operation and outcome. As the vast majority of structural
adjustment programmes turned out to be insufficient in alleviating poverty and achieving sustainable
economic and social development in developing countries by the mid 1980s, “…the efficiency
concerns of the practitioners in development planning and policy-making […] could no longer
afford to ignore women or gender relations…”19 In other words the imperative for an engendering
process came very much from policy-related concerns. To achieve a self-sustaining development
process in development countries (more) efficiently, gender inequality had to be addressed in all areas
of development like the informal sector, formal sector, the household, etc. In IR, conflict/peace studies
and the field of conflict management, by contrast, a clearly defined and agreed on policy-arm, which is
concerned with pressuring efficiency concerns and social change is clearly missing. Along those lines,
the very lack of a legitimate and clearly defined policy-arm constitutes a straightforward and
unobjectionable reason for the slow and marginal engendering process of conflict/peace research and
IR.20
This argument has great surface plausibility. However, it is also deceptive for obscuring the
distinctiveness of the engendering process of IR compared with that of conflict/peace research and
conflict management.  In contrast to the - albeit slow - engendering process of International Relations
of the last couple of years, conflict/peace research's and conflict management's overall silence on
“gender” has remained striking - even more so in the light of conflict management's and conflict/peace
research's focus on both “high” and “low politics” in contrast to IR’s (earlier) main emphasis on “high
politics”.21  Clearly, the focus on macro- and micro-level suggests conflict/peace research and the
field of conflict management to be more conducive to theorize about gender as related to “low
politics”.  So, why is the gender-blindness of conflict management rather persistent and pervasive?
The most obvious area to look for gender-blind spots seems to be the specific research agenda of
conflict management.22 A great deal of attention in conflict management as theory has been devoted
to the analysis of the contextual and process variables of inter-personal/social to international conflicts,
such as the sources and nature of the conflict, third-party characteristics etc., which lead to conflict
management.23 The very little empirical, but not necessarily feminist, research related to “gender” in
the field of conflict management put the main emphasis on the mediator “sex” difference and style
matter and their relation to the effectiveness of conflict management.24 Gender in its three-fold
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dimension (individual gender identity, symbolism of gender and structure of gender) is neither an
analytical category nor an integral part of different approaches to conflict management.
To illustrate and exemplify the gender-blindness of conflict management as theory, I would like to
examine three distinctive approaches to conflict management, i.e., conflict settlement, conflict
resolution, and conflict transformation.
Like early IR, the realist approach to conflict management, conflict settlement à la Zartman and
Bercovitch was heavily preoccupied with the notion of “negative peace” (peace without social
justice), or precisely the “cult of power” from which women have been excluded. The world of the IR
scholars Zartman and Bercovitch is one of international conflicts defined as results of incompatible
interests and competition over rare resources.25 Their analytical focus is an outcome-oriented one.
The “ripe moment”26 decides when there is a “mutually hurting stalemate”27 between two parties to
end the violent conflict and agree, for example, on a cease-fire. Official third party-interventions in the
form of arbitration, negotiations,  “power mediation” or “carrots-and-sticks” (use of leverage or
coercion in form of promised rewards and threatened punishments) indeed represented and reflected
“male hegemony” in so far as most practitioners like diplomats and scholars of conflict management
were (and still are!) men.
Given the focus on the rational and autonomous male selves, social relationships in general and hence
women in particular were denied agency in this approach. One could therefore, like Jacqui True did
for the IR context,28 stress that in conflict management the understanding of human agency is imposed
by taking the standpoint of men as somehow generic. Women and their social interests, ideas and
experience were considered simply irrelevant to the analysis of conflict management and, in turn,
were “hidden”29 or made “invisible”.
John Burton's pluralist, transnational approach to IR set the terms of reference for his more process-
oriented, conflict resolution approach.30 In contrast to W. Zartman and J. Bercovitch, Burton stresses
that conflicts in international relations primarily arise out of the dissatisfaction of human needs. Along
those lines, the conflict origin can be found in the underlying needs (like security, identity, participation,
recognition, distributive justice etc.) of the conflict parties. The aim is to eliminate the violent and
destructive manifestations of conflict which are based on the dissatisfied needs and fears of the
conflict parties. Along those lines, the key is to translate the interests and positions of the parties
involved into the underlying needs for identity, security, and participation. To facilitate and promote
“controlled communication”31 between the conflict parties, he introduced the concept and tool of the
“problem-solving workshop”: an academically based, unofficial third party approach, bringing together
representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication. Based on the human needs theory, a
25
problem-solving workshop aims at reframing the conflict as a shared problem with mutually acceptable
solutions.32 As such, the aim of a “problem-solving workshop” is the satisfaction of both parties, and
hence, increased co-operation and improved communication between the parties involved. Burton's
broadening of the agenda of conflict management (and IR) with regard to questions of distributive
justice and needs' satisfaction makes his approach rather more conducive to theorize about gender
than its realist counterpart. However, the hierarchical power structures, women's needs, the allegedly
non-political “private sphere”, and, most importantly here, the gendered notion of international conflict
are “neutralized”. Violent conflict and its management in particular are basically seen as “gender
neutral”, that is they are viewed as having no effects on the position and role of “women” and “men”
in society. Yet, women may be discussed and “brought in” as an additional category next to other
ethno-national, religious groups joining the problem-solving workshop. Structural notions (like the
gender-specific distribution of labour in most conflict situations) and the symbolic features of gender
(like questions of shifting identities of masculinity and femininity in conflict situations) are excluded and
hence indirectly re-enforced.
John Paul Lederarch and his idea of conflict transformation move far beyond ideas of conflict
resolution and conflict settlement.  According to him, peace-building has best to be understood as a
long-term, multi-dimensional and dynamic process.33 Not only is the aim to include a multiplicity of
peacemakers from the grassroots level to top leadership, but also to create an infrastructure for social
empowerment. In contrast to theorists in conflict resolution and conflict settlement, the scholar-
practitioner Lederarch challenges the notion of simply transferring conflict management techniques
across cultures with little or no understanding at all of the cultural knowledge and resources in the
conflict setting.34 The underlying assumption is that the potential for peace-building already exists in
the particular region or community and hence is rooted in its “traditional culture”. To build on local
struggles then means to be aware of the already existing traditional ways of conflict handling in a
given society. Along those lines, Lederarch has stamped his mark on recent conflict management
discussion as he has criticized most conflict management - both in a realist and pluralist vein - for its
culture-blindness that is its theoretical and practical bias to a Westernized model of conflict handling.
Lederarch's focus on social empowerment and transformation seems most favourable to theorize
about gender.  However, I would argue that in Lederarch's model women seem mainly of empirical
interest. Women qua women's groups may be an integral part of grassroots groups or local peace
constituencies - with what gender-specific consequences and in which gendered conflict context
remains, however, unknown.  The diverse and even shifting identities and roles of women (and men)
are dismissed.  In other words, gender as “women's issue” may be subordinated to  the culture
question. This becomes strikingly obvious when Lederach discusses local peace-making NGOs and
their “indigenous” peacemaking techniques and methods. Lederach dismisses the fact that most
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indigenous customs of conflict handling are based on notions of gender inequality (like stereotypical
notions of masculinity and femininity) and as such may be understood as the reasons for conflict
among the society. An illustrative example may here be the system of the elders in Somalia who, as
all-male members of the community, have the traditional authority to coerce the conflict parties into
settling a conflict and accepting an agreement.
Given that all three approaches are much more complex in theory and practice than this snapshot may
suggest, any attempt to classify various approaches to conflict management must fall short of their
diversity - my attempt here is no exception. However, the brief analysis of the three approaches above
highlighted some of the gender-blind gaps of conflict management as a whole. The male social
character seems hegemonic, in a Gramscian sense, insofar as the absence of women seemed some
somehow “natural”.35 In this context, what V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True attested the of
mainstream/malestream IR research community may also hold true with conflict management, that it
is a “simultaneous reliance on and refusal to theorize hegemonic masculinities.”36
This leads us to another reason for the persistent gender-blindness in conflict management that is
“academic machismo”. The  “added value” of a gender dimension still seems to be somehow unclear
to most “male-/mainstream” practitioners and scholars in the field of conflict management. It seems
fair to say that there is marginal, if any, understanding of feminist theory within conflict management.37
Under the “veil of ignorance”, most of them claim their work has “no gender dimension”38 as women
- if invisible or not - simply do not matter for their analysis of “hard core” questions on high-profile
negotiations, deprived human needs or culture-sensitive bottom-up approaches. The point here is not
so much that most scholars and practitioners ignore the gender dimension of their work on purpose -
more importantly, it seems to be that gender is not purposefully included.  One could argue that this
form of “gender-blindness” reflects in one way or another a bias towards “academic machismo”39 in
the form of academic and disciplinary paternalism and hence “a deep fear of looking at the
microstructuring of masculinity/ies”.40  Related to this reason is the fear of loss of competence and
control over academic resources, agendas and policies as the advocacy of gender issues seems to be
somehow considered as a “win/lose” scenario. It seems safe to say that feminist interventions into
conflict management, like in IR, are often portrayed as mainly interested in “male-bashing”.41 This
misunderstanding refers to the misinterpretation of the meaning and concept of “gender” defined as
“women's issues”. Gender defined as the social construction of social relations should be of as much
interest and concern to men as it is to women. The rather limited and half-hearted understanding of
feminism has to be seen in the wider context of the dismissal of recent discussions in social/political
theory in the field of conflict management like Critical Theory, Postmodernism/Poststructuralism and
Social Constructivism.42
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This, in turn, leads us to the role of theory and theorizing and notions of self-reflexivity  in conflict
management. The field of conflict management is far away from the theoretical and methodological
discussions that have taken place in IR for the last forty years or so. In contrast to conflict
management, IR as a discipline, especially in the Anglo-American research community, has come a
long way from the analytical and “practical” backwardness of a research community which was
virtually silent on questions of ontology (what is being analysed) and epistemology (how it is analysed)
in the early days.  Not only did the so-called 4th debate43 foster questions on ontology and
epistemology, it also promoted “critical perspectivism”44 as a form of critical self-reflection of the
discipline.  It brought home a stronger impetus for dialogue with social/political theory such as Critical
Theory45, Historical Sociology46, Post-Structuralism/Post-modernism47, and feminism, etc., to avoid
methodological and theoretical closure and incarceration48.
By contrast, a study of the relevant literature in the field of conflict management suggests that
dominant approaches are “theory-light”, i.e. they remain rather shy of “theorizing” both with regard to
conflict and conflict management. In fact, the field of conflict management seems to have
“significantly surpassed theory building.”49 Most “realities” of theory and practice of conflict
management are imposed by a rather implicit theoretical framework of conflict.50  Most of the little
theoretical territory guiding conflict management approaches falls into two ontological strands: a
subjectivist versus an objectivist approach to conflict.
As far as the subjectivist approach to conflict is concerned, it puts centre-stage the perceived
incompatibility of goals. The very focus on the subjective awareness has various essential implications.
First, many goals may only be perceived as incompatible but, in fact, may be compatible. This may be
due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, and misperception like stereotypes, mistrust, or
emotional stress.  Second, structural, unfair and unjust relationships tend to be dismissed as long as, for
example, one of two involved parties may not perceive its dependence and unequal treatment as such
(the phenomenon of the “happy slave”).
It is exactly the latter with which an objectivist approach is concerned: it looks for the origin of conflict
in the social and political make-up and structure of society. The crucial point is that conflict may exist
independent of the perceptions of the parties involved. The conflict/peace researcher Schmid gives the
example of a class conflict which “…is not a conflict because the classes have incompatible goals,
fight each other, and hate each other.  It is a conflict because the social structure is such that one
class loses what the other class wins.”51
The very distinction of subjectivity/objectivity says, in the end, very little of analytical value. In
considering the structure of a system as conflictual and violent, even though the parties involved do not
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perceive a conflict of interests, the observer and his/her values do decide whether a conflict exists.
This is to say, too, that the objectivist approach itself is not value-free as it just reflects “another
subjective assessment of the situation […] by some third party rather than by the participants.”52
A glance through the conflict management literature will suffice to suggest that most conflict
management approaches or strategies are not based on a broad theoretical concept of conflict or an
explicit theory of conflict.53
Along those lines, one could argue that in most conflict management literature there is “…no real
theoretical justification for when (who) and why to use conflict intervention techniques”.54 By
contrast, one may find “…a number of processes which are dependent upon the idiosyncratic
expertise of the individual practitioner”.55 Most of them turn out to be rather static models which are
“…inductive descriptions of core components of practice, with some prescriptive guidelines for
interventions”.56 The most predominant example may here be the work of the Harvard Negotiation
project.57
Others, like Bercovitch, aim at developing regularities, if not causal explanations about “effective”
conflict management.  Along these lines, research may come in the form of large-scale systematic
studies on “effective” conflict management or more experimental and laboratory approaches to third
party intervention. Large-scale systematic studies à la Bercovitch are given particular analytical
attention as they are considered to produce the most policy-relevant findings for political decision-
makers.58
As a result, the understanding of theory adopted in the field of conflict management is very much
reduced to the explanation of observable or personal experience defined in cause-effects logic or
policy recommendations. The ultimate test of theory is suggested to be its usefulness and technical
applicability in guiding and orientating policy towards given ends, like the settlement of violent conflicts.
Now, I hear time and again a lot of scholar-practitioners of conflict management half in self-defence,
half in despair, saying “Our focus is on practice, the real world out there, why should we care (so
much) about theory?” Apart from anything else, this points to a rather limited understanding of theory
in the field of conflict management. Most conflict management research seems (more implicitly than
explicitly) to work exclusively with the understanding of theory as an empirical tool.59 That is, theory
should first and foremost offer a framework to analyse and describe (and sometimes predict) the “real
world”. The “real world” of conflict management consists of and is set by, for example, certain
criteria of third party characteristics, the behaviour of conflict parties and intervening variables like
third party resources (like coercion, expertise, reward), etc.60
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to spell out the (striking) methodological differences
between the work of, for example, Ronald Fisher, Roger Fisher and Jacob Bercovitch, what seems to
matter most here is that all of them subscribe to objectivism. That is, the view that objective
knowledge of the “real world out there” is possible whether or not this knowledge is grounded in
subjective experience. Based on a (strict) subject-object and values-facts distinction, scientific,
“objective” findings do not only sharply contrast with value judgements, which are considered to be
highly subjective, but are given epistemological priority. Only a few scholars like Adam Curle may
reject such kind of understanding and subscribe to Galtung's definition of “objectivity as an inter-
subjective dialogue based on explicit premises i.e. values”.61 This is to say, too, that the prime
analytical focus of conflict management research is on empirical evidence, without explicitly
considering that theoretical notions already inform the practice of conflict management itself. Most of
the past research in the field of conflict management, especially in the Anglo-American research
community, largely focused on the detached analysis of third parties’ strategies and behaviour, nature
of conflicts, etc.  Burton's credo to get “from subjectivity to theory-based objectivity”62 turns out to be
“…inappropriate because any analysis of the social world will be infused with the values of the
analyst. In a world of competing values, the merits of any particular model, therefore, are not self-
evident. No model is free from ideology. Since John Burton wishes to change the world, he has no
alternative but to make the argument for change in ideological terms. It is counter-productive to dress
one's values in natural science garb. A non-ideological model of social order is a chimera which it is a
mistake to claim or pursue.”63
By subscribing to theory as empirical tool most theoretical or conceptual approaches to conflict
management turn out to be - what Robert Cox called - “problem-solving approaches”,64 that is, they
work with and within a given dominant framework of institutions and social relations.65 This is
important as, by definition, a “problem-solving approach” “…takes the world as it finds it, with the
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given
framework for action.”66  Further, a “problem-solving approach” does not reflect critically on the very
framework of social order/status quo like its gendered nature or its androcentric (male-centered)
universality and objectivity. This may also explain why most of the existing conceptual and explanatory
frameworks work with implicit or taken-for-granted agreement about the notions of (social) justice and
hence (negative and positive) peace.67 What is strikingly missing is an explicit, normative, theoretical
founding essential for evaluating and understanding conflict management “success”.68  Lewis
Rasmussen, Nadim Rouhana and Joy Rothman stress that most evaluation is done poorly, or is
completely ignored, mainly because “the theoretical grounds on which an intervention has been built
have not been clarified”.69
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That is to say, too, that the largely unstated and “hidden” values of the scholars define what is
“success” in conflict management. The idea of, for example, an “effective” outcome of conflict
management then looks more like a highly subjective value construction than an objective description:
to label a conflict management effort as success is itself a value judgment.70 This critique is partly
taken up in the ongoing discussion on current discussions on “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment”
(PCIA) in the field of conflict management and development. To keep it simple, PCIA aims at
offering a conceptual framework for systematically anticipating and evaluating the potential and actual
peace-building (or peace-inhibiting) impact of development projects in war-prone areas, and vice
versa.
The conclusions of the above analysis for the discussion on the gender-blindness in conflict
management are as follows:
The gender-blindness was the final straw in the overall refusal of ontological and epistemological
considerations in conflict management. Due to a rather limited understanding of theory, it was possible
to focus on the “reality” of conflict management practice without acknowledging how far the practice
was already informed by highly normative but taken-for-granted assumptions in terms of, for example,
the legitimacy, power and “neutrality” of the third party, universal and generic human needs, unequal
distribution of power among the parties, the “successful” and “impartial” conflict management
process, etc. The reason being that most of the research in conflict management was based on flawed
dichotomies such as objectivity/subjectivity, fact/values, etc. One could argue that most research in
conflict management does not rise above the fact-value dichotomizing in the form of a theoretically
rigorous reflection on the underlying conceptual frameworks of its research.71 In social science, as in
the field of conflict management, dualist dichotomies tend to appear as rather fixed, and even
“necessary” and natural categorical oppositions.72 Naturalizing and normalizing dualist dichotomies
seem to go hand in hand with making them “invisible”. As such, the very structure of dualist
dichotomies suggests resisting and easily slipping any kind of critical theorizing. This, in turn, explains
not only the overall reluctance of the field of conflict management to address the value/fact split in any
meaningful way, but also the rather persistent resistance to the engendering process. Feminists of
different persuasions showed in how far the Western culture in general and Western epistemology in
particular are derived from the “female”/”feminine” and “male/masculine” dichotomies and
hierarchies.73 Indeed, Western science is first and foremost genderized “…through a belief system
that equates objectivity with masculinity and a set of cultural values that simultaneously (and
conjointly) elevates what is defined as scientific and what is defined as masculine.”74 This is to say
that “…gender hierarchy is not coincidental to but in a significant sense constitutive of Western
philosophy's objectivist metaphysics”.75 To invent and impose knowledge was therefore built on and
associated with the controlling and subordinating of “nature” which was metaphorically associated
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with the “female”/”feminine”. “To be natural” suggests to be non-political and as such, calls for little,
if any, analytical attention. The assumption that something is “natural” and not dependent on human
construction has straightforward effects in terms of reproducing existing power structures.76 Women
and their “typical” social life, like homework, birth, raising of children, were defined not power-laden
and as such were considered “non-political” and “natural”. While the “private sphere” was outside
the jurisdiction of state authority, men in the “public sphere” were in power and rule in politics,
military, law and economy. At the same time, the “private sphere” was heavily controlled and shaped
by the “public sphere”: To secure the hegemony of men and the functioning of the “public sphere”,
men restricted women 's civil and political rights. This was justified by women's very “nature” which
was considered unsuited for social, political and economic responsibilities outside the “private sphere”.
As such, “…the masculinity of the public sphere is privileged at the expense of feminine activities in
the private sphere.”77 In other words, the public/private split may be understood as the inherently
ontological fundament of any idea of politics based on dependence and dominance on the one hand
and inclusion/exclusion on the other hand.
Therefore, it seems fair to say that the field of conflict management became, via its underlying gender-
blind disciplines like IR, philosophy, psychology, economics, etc., complicit in constructing the
dichotomy between “inside” and “outside” in conflict management. The implicit commitment to the
public-private split has rendered the private sphere and women at its centre  “non-political” and
“invisible”. This, in turn, may explain the reluctance to address the “gendered”, somehow “natural”
features of violent conflict like (the increase in) domestic violence, rape, changes of family structures
and social structure, etc. in conflict/peace research and the field of conflict management. Along those
lines, the “gendered” nature of international and “internationalized” conflict management remains
invisible. Most conflict settlements and many bottom-up approaches take the form of “gendered
deals”;78 that is formal and informal peace negotiations and initiatives tend to exclude women in the
implementation process and the relevant decision- and policy-making bodies. By the same token, other
“gendered” features of conflict management processes, for example, forms of increased domestic
violence in the post-settlement phase, radical changes of family and social structures were made
invisible as allegedly “non-political”.
The Solution? Feminism and its Tricky Relationship with Conflict
Management
Given the overall absence of women and feminists in international conflict management, the silence on
gender in conflict management seems less striking, but still particularly ironic in the face of feminism's
longstanding association with pacifism.79
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In the anglophone research community most female scholars and feminists who got involved in
“gender and conflict” have a background (academic or practical) in development studies/co-
operation.80  That should not come as surprise for two reasons:
First, as mentioned earlier, there has been a huge body of evidence in development studies on the
“gendered” nature of development aid and its implying “male bias”,81 both at the conceptual level of
structural adjustment and in their operation and outcome since the mid 1980s.
Secondly, many current development co-operation projects take place in violent conflict situations and
hence have to deal, in one way or another, with the social and economic effects of crisis escalation
and post-settlement peace-building.82
Both the empirical and theoretical body of evidence on “women/gender and conflict”83 in the 1980s
and 1990s concentrated very much on the emergency situation but with little reference to the post-
settlement peace-building process and an explicit non-”gendered peace deal”. This is to say too, that
conflict management as theory and practice in its different facets was not the primary analytical
concern of most of these scholars. By the same token, the terms “conflict analysis”, “peace-building”
and “conflict resolution” (all interrelated but yet distinctive areas of interests both in substance and
emphasis) were often used interchangeable if not synonymously.84 While one may argue that this may
reflect a lack of a coherent conceptual and theoretical rigour in some feminist work, I would argue
that it misses a more general problem already touched upon earlier: Given the multidisciplinary and
complex nature of the field of conflict management as theory and practice, it seems safe to say that
feminism may seem to find it somehow difficult to situate itself. One could argue that feminist
approaches to the underlying disciplines of conflict management like law, psychology, philosophy,
international relations, politics, economics etc. are still preoccupied with the reconstruction and
deconstruction of these gender-blind disciplines. One could also make the point that feminist
approaches which are busy with deconstructing and reconstructing the discipline-specific gender-
blind spots of the underpinnings of conflict management implicitly engage in conflict management.
Yet they are simply too busy to explicitly and deliberately  focus on the “gender-blindness” of
conflict management as theory and practice. At the same time, however, the distinctiveness of the
“gender-blindness” of conflict management as theory and practice seems to be part and parcel of the
rather limited feminist interest in conflict management.
On the one hand, the co-operative and non-adversarial features of the theory and practice of conflict
resolution/conflict transformation run in tandem with the essentialist notion of “women as
peacemakers”.  Indeed, the essentialist equation of women with peace and its building fit  - somehow
too - nicely into Herb Kelman’s and John Burton’s idea of the mediator associated with patience,
33
empathy, non-violence. Some feminists, therefore, might argue that the practice of conflict resolution
just incorporates and practices inherently female characteristics such as compassion, empathy, co-
operation etc. Along those lines, conflict resolution as theory and practice stresses the stereotypical
female attributes “to sustain life”. And women become the “female mediators”85. So why be critical
of conflict resolution which is based on allegedly inherent female characteristics and implicitly seems
to support the equation of “woman with the peaceful sex”? This, in turn, goes back to the old debate in
feminism on questions of war and peace and women’s involvement in them.86 It seems here to pop up
in the disguise of conflict management.
On the other hand, international conflict management did not do much in the last thirty years to portray
itself as an exciting “new” enterprise - distinctively different from mainstream/malestream IR. In fact,
until recently, introductory textbooks on conflict management either did not exist or failed, indeed, to
stress its multidisciplinary approach.87 Apart from an exclusively psychological perspective, most of
the academic literature in conflict management was either written from a realist or
institutionalist/pluralist IR.  A case in point is that most of the theorists in international conflict
management are still either IR scholars or psychologists. Many feminists may have read conflict
management in the international arena as a prime example of another form of “masculine
hegemony”88 and the perpetuation of the “cult of power” in early-IR. From a feminist perspective the
whole “enterprise” of international conflict management appears first and foremost as one of
domination. International conflict management conflict management on the conceptual and more
practical level remains a “man's world”. In contrast to the domestic and local level, most of the
practitioners and academics involved in international conflict management are still men.
Therefore, one could argue that the field of conflict management in the international arena perpetuates
and indirectly enforces the exclusionist power structures and power hierarchies among a patriarchal
society. Some feminists may argue that most third-party interventions tend to reduce or suppress
social conflicts like gender inequality. Along those lines, one has to ask how far there is the danger
that in the push for privacy of most third-party interventions women's interests are once again
marginalised or co-opted. This goes to the heart of the problem: is there a “wolf in sheep's clothing”,
that is, do we change the symbols but subscribe to the “old” principles and practices of patriarchy in
the “new” post-settlement social order?89
By managing or “continually resolving conflicts”90, conflict management remains caught in the logic
and practices of management and, as such, neglects the underlying power arrangements of conflict
management initiatives like the gender inequality. This idea carried further suggests that most
international conflict management turns a blind eye to an understanding of violent conflicts as positive
moments of radical social change. During violent conflict situations, many women take over
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traditionally male-defined responsibilities and tasks and  - despite gross human rights' violations and
everyday brutality - break with the old social order.
Or as Esmeralda, a woman from El Salvador, puts it: “(…) I feel we have learnt something about
what living in this country is about…how some people have more opportunities than others and how
people from poor classes live. (…) I also learnt how to work(…). I have stopped being scared. [I've
learnt] to speak out in front of people, to know more things, about others as well as myself.”91
In the light of their survival of violence and social and economic deprivation, women may challenge
traditional gender stereotypes by taking on non-traditional roles like becoming combatants, heads of
households and by gaining (more) self-confidence and new economic and political skills. In Sri Lanka,
Tamil women actively participate in the war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE as
LTTE fighters and suicide bombers. Due to the ongoing war many households turned into female-
headed households, where women became the dominant breadwinners and took over “traditional”
male roles and duties.
This is to say, too, in some protracted social conflicts women who were subjected to social and
cultural restrictions, sexual abuse and/or domestic violence in the pre-violent conflict situations may
perceive violent conflicts as moments of empowerment and true liberation. Hence, the ending of a
violent conflict promotes, for example, not only changes in the division of labour, in the political
(trans)formation and women's involvement in them, but may also lead to (radical) changes in gender
relations. However, one cannot stress strongly enough that all these changes need not be necessarily
permanent and empowering for women in the long-term.  And one should keep in mind that civilians,
and here predominantly women and children, are both targets and the most vulnerable victims of all
protracted social conflicts like in Sri Lanka, Liberia or El Salvador. What seems to matter most is to
see the ambiguous character of violent conflicts for most women. While some violent conflicts may
indeed represent intermediate catalysts for women's empowerment, wars are first and foremost
experienced as devastating human tragedy, gross atrocities and large-scale (“gendered”) human rights
violations (like sexual violence, and rape, forced prostitution). Hence, while discussing women's
agency in violent conflict and its management process, one has to keep in mind the uneasy tension
between women's “vulnerability/victimhood” on the one hand and “empowerment/emancipation” on
the other, without prioritising one over the other.
Following the line of argument above, one may assume that it would be a straightforward and crucial
task to decode conflict management's “gender-blind” spots both on a conceptual and empirical level.
Yet, violent conflicts and their management as “gendered” social phenomena have remained by and
large unquestioned and rather under-theorised in feminism. In fact, in the past, most current NGO
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work and academic research mainly focused on the impact of conflict on women (and on men and
gender relations). A case in point here may be the growing body of evidence, which analyses the
diversity of women's activities and “new experiences” in the course of a conflict that may have social,
political and economic consequences for the post-settlement peace-building process.92 While
portraying the great variety of active roles played by women during violent conflict and in the wider
peace-building process, this approach obscures the complex nature and dynamics of “gender” and its
relevance to international conflict in general, and to the theory and practice of international conflict
management in particular.
Most of the work has until now fallen short of an analysis of the impact of gender relations on
conflict in general and on conflict management in particular. This is to say that most research
neglected that, for example, local methods or customs of conflict resolution which are based on gender
inequality might even foster conflictual patterns among society. In fact, most indigenous customs of
conflict handling are based on stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity. An illustrative
example may here be the system of the elders in Somalia who, as all-male members of the community,
have the traditional authority to coerce the conflict parties into settling a conflict and accepting an
agreement. This not only raises the culture/gender “double bind” crucial questions on the notions of
(im)partiality, power and a more partisan  approach to conflict transformation, but it also poses some
serious challenges as to how to get the culture and gender-dimension of conflict management
sufficiently and equally considered in theory and practice.  On a more positive note, one has to keep in
mind that gender (identity) is made up of the other important variables class, age, religion, ethnicity,
etc. and, hence, any analysis of peace-building activities in a specific region and at specific time has to
been seen against this background. Or to put it the other way round, a gender analysis has always to
take into account the wider constraining social, economic and political forces of rebuilding society after
a violent conflict. This, in turn, clearly speaks to the importance of more contextualized in-depth
analyses, comparative case studies and “lessons learned” studies of gender relations and their
impact on post-war peace-building activities: How far is international and inter-group conflict and
its management based, even dependent on, certain gender arrangements? How far are different
theoretical and practical approaches to conflict management based on similar (or even the same)
gendered concepts, underlying gendered imagery and symbolism found in mainstream IR? What is
discussed, what is left out in the gender-neutral language in the field of conflict management? How
are masculinity and femininity defined in the broader peace-building process compared with wartime?
From Gender-Blindness to Engendering Conflict Management?
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In a field as heterogeneous and dynamic as conflict management, the above discussion does not
represent an exhaustive account of the rich tradition and complexity of different approaches and their
theoretical and empirical interpretation - in/outside the anglophone research community. Such a brief
analysis could not do more than highlight the most crucial aspects of the gender-blindness of conflict
management. However, focusing on the issue of gender-blindness the following analytical gaps and
disjunctions became evident as the most predominant reasons for the gender-blindness of conflict
management:
· “Gender-blindness” as the inherent fundament of other disciplines
· Lack of a legitimate and clearly defined policy-arm which is concerned with efficiency pressures
· Gender-neutral understanding of conflict and its management
· Early focus on the cult of power from which women have been excluded
· Half-hearted or limited inclusion of feminism within/by the mainstream suggests “academic
machismo” on the one hand and academic paternalism on the other
· Misunderstandings encountered about feminism in conflict management
· Limited understanding of theory and refusal of normative considerations
· General poor attention paid to wider debates of social/political theory
· Predominance of “problem-solving” approaches within conflict management in the light of limited
self-reflexivity
· Research community's very failure to re-address the fact-value split
· Tricky and ambiguous relationship of feminism with conflict management
Given that most conflict management as theory remains gender-blind, the most crucial impetus should
be to avoid a theoretical and empirical framework which continues to be couched in gender-neutral
terms. Therefore, what seems to matter most is the gender-sensitive deconstruction and
reconstruction of the used gendered imagery, categories and institutions - both in positivist and in
latest postpositivist approaches to conflict management. This, in turn, must include the addressing of
misunderstandings about feminism (and the meaning of gender!) commonly encountered in the field of
conflict management.
A more thorough engendering process of conflict management will be highly dependent on the
openness of conflict management practitioners and scholars, and here most likely of the very few
feminists among them, to bring into the open the gender-blindness of conflict management as theory.
The underlying assumption - albeit highly controversial among some feminists - is that there is indeed a
place for a gender-sensitive analysis in such an extremely androcentric field as conflict management. I
would argue that a gender analysis with its three-fold definition of gender (individual gender identity,
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symbolism of gender and structure of gender) is an important entry point for understanding and
situating the complex, internal power dynamics of conflict management activities and promoting social
justice in peace-building activities. Apart from anything else, this is mainly due to three distinctive
reasons that point to three rather neglected areas in the field of conflict management.
Firstly, most analysis of conflict management works with a rather simplistic and static notion of
identity. While John Burton and E. Azar, among others, stressed the identity group as the most
relevant unit of analysis in the study of “protracted” or “intractable” social conflicts, their work does
not account for the fact of shifting and constructed identities and their connections with violence in
most violent conflicts.93 Due to its explicit emphasis on the individual, a gender analysis encourages the
scholar/practitioner to focus on the individual and his/her changing identities, roles, needs and interests
in the pre- and post-conflict situation.
Secondly, by its very definition a gender analysis intermediates between the individual and the
structural level. It addresses essential linkages between the micro-level (the individual) and the macro-
level (the organisation of social action in the private and public sphere) by taking into account the
meso-level (symbolism of gender like certain notions of masculinity and femininity). At the same time,
it synthesises the analysis of the private (the individual and the household) and the public sphere (the
community, the state and the international arena). A gender analysis enables us to analyse the impact
of violent conflicts on individuals, how they suffer, what underlying constraining and enabling factors
(like violent forms of masculinity or femininity) may drive them to use or incite them to use violence.
In fact, a gender analysis has the potential to generate closer-knit linkages between different levels of
analysis and different categories of actors.94  It addresses in how far the individual motivation may be
shaped and constrained or fostered by the (gender) symbolism and structure of the community level
and beyond. By the same token, it may help us to throw light on male and female violence, with
neither being the result of purely individual motivations, but generated by a particular configuration of
gender symbolism and structure (embodied in social institutions which promote certain notions of
femininity and masculinity). In a word, looking at conflict management through “gender lenses” may
bring into the open the shifting identities of women and men, the underlying symbolism of femininity
and masculinity and its structural manifestation, i.e. the organisation and institutionalisation of social
action in the public and private sphere, during and after conflict management processes.
Thirdly, a gender analysis is a tool to directly address dichotomous, dualist theorizing in the field of
conflict management.  Gender, by its very definition, informs about and criticizes the very organisation
and institutionalisation of social action based on the “colonizing dichotomies”95 ofmasculinity
(associated with objectivity/reason/power/violence/fact, etc.) and femininity (equated with
subjectivity/feeling/powerlessness/non-violence/value, etc.). The argument carried further suggests
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that with the ongoing analytical lack of attention to gender in conflict management as theory, any kind
of dichotomous, dualist theorizing cannot be successfully challenged and transformed, but, on the
contrary, will be further reinforced.
At the same time, there is still a great need for sophisticated gender-specific or gender-related in-
depth analysis of conflict management, for example, with regard to the culture/gender “double bind” in
most conflict management processes or women's inclusion in and exclusion from formal negotiations.
The very exclusion of women from, for example, the UN-organised, -facilitated and -sponsored peace
conferences in Somalia, helped to enhance the legitimacy and authority of the warlords, who are often
strangers to the local communities. But what would have been different if women had been included in
the formal and informal negotiations from the very beginning? Would women have made a difference
in the peace conferences?
If one makes the point that the impetus (albeit slow) for a stronger analytical focus on gender issues in
the field of conflict management comes very much from the more engendered field of development96,
the question then is how to apply gender-sensitive “lessons learned” studies of development aid to the
field of conflict management. This also seems highly timely, given the current debates on “Peace and
Conflict Impact Assessment” both in the field of conflict management and development co-
operation.97
The field of development co-operation has produced and developed a great deal of gender
frameworks and gender-sensitive tools over the last ten years or so.  These are, among others, the
Harvard Analytical Framework/Gender Roles Framework (GRF) and derived from it Capacities and
Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA), the Development Planning Unit Framework (DPUF) and Social
Relations Framework (SRF).  While all conceptual frameworks are not specifically developed to
addresses and explain the conflict situation and its distinctive pre- and post-crisis features, all of them
were, however, applied in emergency/crisis situations. The intriguing challenge, then, is to show how
far the field of crisis prevention and conflict management can actually learn from the field of
development.  How, to what extent, and which gender frameworks of the development field may, if
at all, be successfully applied to and integrated in the field of conflict management?
I am led to my final conclusion. Without any more additional steps to embed and institutionalise the
benefits from feminist and non-feminist “cross-fertilisation” in the form of journals, working groups,
etc., the conflict management community will repeat and re-create discussions on “women or gender
and conflict” and on a lucky and sunny day even “women or gender and conflict management” on a
rather ad-hoc basis which may not go beyond academic paternalism and good will declarations. This is
to say, too, that the engendering process will always remain partial and marginal if gender-aware
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analysis and research is considered as “surplus work” on “women's issues” by the malestream
research community or is highly dependent on the “tyranny of the urgent” in the form of policy
pressures!
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